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What is a Search Engine? The Simple Question the
Court of Justice of the European Union Forgot to Ask
and What It Means for the Future of the Right to be
Forgotten
Julia Kerr

Abstract
The Court of Justice of the E.U.’s right to be forgotten ruling, which subjected search
engines to the Data Protection Directive’s restrictions, was controversial from the moment it was
delivered. Free speech advocates claimed that the ruling authorized needless censorship, while
privacy rights advocates argued that the ruling provided much-needed privacy protection in the
internet age. The right to be forgotten ruling is deliberately broad, yet reinforces the Directive’s
journalistic exception to protect free speech. However, the CJEU’s failure to define the term
“search engine” in its decision unintentionally allows the Directive’s exception to be circumvented.
More countries outside the E.U. are beginning to express an interest in recognizing a right to be
forgotten within domestic laws, it is important that the right to be forgotten’s scope be clarified
sooner rather than later. A few countries are skeptical of recognizing a right to be forgotten due
to its breadth, which could be made worse if the term “search engine” is not refined. While the
right to be forgotten could be incorporated into existing international law, having search engines
apply their right to be forgotten policies internationally is the most realistic way of meeting the
growing demand. Therefore, these concerns must be addressed so that search engines can
comfortably satisfy the global community’s need to protect citizens’ data privacy.
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I. S EARCH E NGINES AND THE R IGHT TO BE F ORGOTTEN
In May of 2014, the Court of Justice of the E.U. (CJEU) jeopardized the
fundamental right to free speech in order to protect the individual’s privacy rights.
In its groundbreaking right to be forgotten ruling, the CJEU clarified the E.U.’s
Data Protection Directive (Directive),1 holding that the Directive applied not only
to source websites, but also to search engines.2 Many European countries already
vehemently protect their citizens’ individual privacy, and this ruling further
entrenches this protection. The U.S., on the other hand, prizes the right to free
speech above many fundamental human rights, including privacy.3 Because the
Directive is now understood to apply to the most basic and easily-utilized medium
of accessing information,4 free speech advocates are worried. And while many
consider bringing search engines within the Directive’s scope to be over-inclusive,
the CJEU’s ruling may be even broader than scholars initially thought. The right
to be forgotten ruling provides only one example of a search engine—Google, the
defendant in the case—but its description of a search engine is ambiguous and
broad, making it ripe for exploitation. If this characterization remains unrestricted,
expanding privacy rights could further restrict rights to freedom of speech.
However, the E.U. is unlikely to be so dismissive of the right to free speech.
The E.U. enacted the Directive to protect privacy.5 With an emphasis on
personal autonomy and an eye toward the rapid technological evolution, the
Directive established legal standards for data processing that ensured that
individuals could maintain a degree of control over their data and reputation.6
1

It is important to note that, although the CJEU decision was based on its interpretation of the
Directive, the E.U. is currently in the process of adopting a reform that would update the
Directive. The E.U. refers to the reform as the General Data Protection Regulation. One of the
biggest changes the General Data Protection Regulation will make to the Directive is its formal
inclusion of the right to be forgotten, although the right’s boundaries still remain vague. Otherwise,
the General Data Protection Regulation’s reforms do not affect this Comment’s analysis. See
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of
Individuals with Regards to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General
Data Protection Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter General Data Protection
Regulation].

2

Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, (2014),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=542615 (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Balancing Freedom of Speech on the Internet under International Law, 39 N.C. J. INT’L.
& COM. REG. 701, 716 (2014).
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of
Personal Data].
See generally id.
See generally id.

3

4

5
6
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Even though the Directive authorizes online content removal in the name
of privacy protection, it still considers the fundamental importance of the right to
free speech. The Directive limits its purview to include exemptions––for example,
for “solely . . . journalistic purposes”––to complying with right to be forgotten
requests.7 However, since these limitations are confined to specific data uses, they
are unlikely to restrain the scope of search engines subject to the Directive’s
mandate. By identifying specific exceptions, the Directive intends for courts to
apply them narrowly.
There is a general assumption that a search engine is a stand-alone website
dedicated solely to indexing the World Wide Web and providing organized
hyperlinks to web pages in response to search terms.8 Web giants like Google and
Yahoo are frequently cited examples illustrating this assumption.9 Contrary to this
usage, the E.U. Courts and the CJEU Advocates General have adopted a broader
interpretation of what a search engine is. They refer to any search feature—even
internal ones operating solely within other websites10––linking users to websites
based on the user’s choice of search terms as a “search engine.”11 Such a nebulous
7
8
9

10

11

Id. at art. 9.
See What is a Search Engine, B.B.C., (June 6, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/webwise/0/22562913.
See, e.g., Google Spain SL, supra note 2, ¶ 20; Case C-202/12, Innoweb BV v. Wegener ICT Media
BV, ¶ 24 (2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=145914&
pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=545155 (last visited Apr.
19, 2016); Case C-657/11, Belgian Electronic Sorting Technology NV v. Bert Peelaers, ¶ 21 (2013),
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=135471&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=546526 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016); Case C324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 31, 38; Opinion of Advocate
General Jääskinen, Interflora Inc v. Marks & Spencer plc, Case C-323/09, 2011 E.C.R. I-8630,
¶ 16.
For example, these internal search engines may be featured within legal research sites, social media,
and even court websites. For examples on how the Advocates General of the CJEU have used
“search engine” broadly, see, for example, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Proposed Accession
of the E.U. to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, ¶ 224 (2014), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=
CELEX:62013CP0002&from=EN (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (referring to HUDOC’s search
feature as a search engine); Yvette Ostolaza and Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web
2.0: The Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 56, 66 (2010) (referring to social
networksearch features as “internal search engine[s]”); Katja Weckström, Liability for Trademark
Infringement for Internet Service Providers, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012) (referring to
eBay’s search feature as an “internal search engine”).
Liberty v. United Kingdom, App. No. 58243/00, 2008 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 43,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207 (last visited April. 20, 2016) (referring to HUDOC’s
search feature as a search engine); Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, Google Spain SL v.
Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, Case C-131/12 ¶ 33 (2013), http://curia.europa.eu/
juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=138782&page.
Index=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=554529 (last visited Apr. 20,
2016); Case T-186/12, Copernicus-Trademarks Ltd v. Office for Harmonisation in the Internal
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interpretation can pose a problem for free speech advocates: subjecting any and
all search features to the Directive could entirely suppress even purely journalistic
information, despite any exemptions.12
The CJEU’s right to be forgotten ruling failed to define “search engine” for
purposes of the Directive; Google was the defendant in the case, therefore the
assumptions described above were not challenged. There are three resulting
problems from this assumption. First, when this ruling is taken to its logical limit,
the Directive could apply to the internal search engines operating within
government, police, and court websites, among others, forcing these websites to
delink and remove content specifically published for public benefit. Some lawyers
have alleged that others within the industry have already abused the right to be
forgotten.13 The right may be further exploited if “search engine” is intended to
be an all-inclusive term: it will increase the pool of potential clients whom lawyers
may seek to needlessly represent in right to be forgotten actions.
Second, administrative costs from sorting through removal requests will be
much greater if the CJEU intended for “search engine” to apply to a larger pool
of data controllers under the Directive. Google’s Transparency Report reveals that
people have eagerly invoked the right to be forgotten ruling: 419,516 recent
requests have already been made to remove 1,458,691 URLs from Google as of
April 20, 2016.14 Defining the scope of the applicable entities could affect how
Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM), ¶ 72 (2015), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
document/document.jsf?text=&docid=165226&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&oc
c=first&part=1&cid=554796 (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (using “search engine” to apply to two nonGoogle Internet sites, one of them being private); Case C-202/12, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–9 (referring to
websites other than Google as providing or containing search engines); Thaddeus J. Holynski, Legal
Research on the World Wide Web, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1141, 1143 (2002) (including LawCrawler and
LawRunner as examples of search engines).
12

For example, while an individual may not request that a news article mentioning that individual’s
name be removed, that individual may request standard search engines, such as Google, along with
any other internal search engine that may archive that information, to remove links to it such that
the information becomes virtually inaccessible. See FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2016); GOOGLE COURT DECISION: THE
RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN?, http://www.dentons.com/en/insights/alerts/2014/may/29/googlecourt-decision-the-right-to-be-forgotten (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).

13

These claims include accusing “ambulance-chasing lawyers” of capitalizing on the breadth of CJEU’s
right to be forgotten ruling and manipulating people into believing that they must hire a lawyer to
help them remove their data from the Internet. In actuality, people can make right to be forgotten
requests on their own, for free. See Chris Green, Law Firms Exploiting E.U. ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Ruling
to Help Individuals Remove Awkward Newspaper Articles from Google, INDEPENDENT (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/law-firms-exploiting-eu-right-to-beforgotten-ruling-to-help-individuals-remove-awkward-newspaper-10185164.html.
EUROPEAN PRIVACY REQUESTS FOR SEARCH REMOVALS, https://www.google.com/transparency
report/removals/europeprivacy/?hl=en (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).

14
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many more requests can be made and of which entities. On small-scale or
governmental websites containing internal search engines, publishers may hesitate
to post information whether or not it violates the Directive due to these costs.
Third, broadly defining “search engine” could nullify the effectiveness of
virtually all resources connecting the public to information that is otherwise
difficult to find. Freedom of speech concerns become apparent in this context:
publishing web content freely would mean little if its exposure and accessibility is
limited or non-existent. Almost every (American) article written on the right to be
forgotten decries the right’s imposition on freedom of speech and the “rewrit[ing
of] history” it allows.15 Free speech advocates are particularly concerned about
rewriting history in the internet context since the internet is celebrated for its
ability to preserve and disseminate information to a wide audience.16 Because of
the Directive’s impact on information produced on the internet, and the growing
international interest in the right to be forgotten, it is important to clarify what
“search engine” means for the Directive’s purposes.
It is very likely that the CJEU understood the Directive as broadly including
all forms––internal and external––of search engines to maintain the high level of
commitment and protection European states traditionally afford to personality
rights.17 Member States’ balancing of personality rights against the freedom of
speech supports this position. France and Germany explicitly protect personality

15

16

17

Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic
Data Flow, 28 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 349, 354 (2015) (declaring that the Right to be Forgotten
“cannibalize[s] free expression”). For some examples see Patricia Sánchez Abril & Jacqueline D.
Lipton, The Right to be Forgotten: Who Decides What the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363, 384 (2015)
(“Asking entities . . . [to implement] a right to be forgotten is, in some ways, asking for the right
to . . . overtake other rights, like freedom of expression”); Emily Adams Shoor, Narrowing the Right
to be Forgotten: Why the European Union Needs to Amend the Proposed Data Protection Regulation, 39
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 487, 493 (2014) (noting that European countries “place a greater premium on
individual privacy,” which affects how the Directive prioritizes the Right to be Forgotten over
freedom of speech).
Fundamental Freedoms: Internet Privacy and Speech, Canadian Civil Liberties Association,
https://ccla.org/issues/fundamental-freedoms/internet-privacy-and-speech/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2016).
Personality rights protect “various attributes of personality [including] privacy, image, voice, bodily
integrity, name, and reputation.” Eric H. Reiter, Personality and Patrimony: Comparative Perspectives on
the Right to One’s Image, 76 TUL. L. REV. 673, 680 (2002).
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and privacy rights18 in their constitutions,19 and the E.U.’s Charter of Fundamental
Rights also protects these rights.20
This Comment will look to European values, case law, and legislation to
predict whether the Directive applies to search engines in their broadest sense, or
if some restrictions can be implied from the CJEU ruling. Section II will describe
the right to be forgotten ruling that sparked the debate over whether privacy and
speech rights can coexist. Section III of this Comment will explore how the term
“search engine” has been applied within the European judicial and legislative
contexts. Section IV will examine the Directive and how European Courts have
interpreted it. Section V will examine European case law and legislation balancing
privacy rights against the freedom of speech for guidance on how broad the
Directive is intended to be. Finally, Section VI will expand the right to be
forgotten analysis to the international context to predict what the global future of
this Right might be.

II. T HE CJEU’ S R IGHT TO BE F ORGOTTEN R ULING
In this technology age, States face the novel challenge of how to maintain
the free flow of communication while balancing the need to protect their citizens’
privacy and data distribution rights.21 The E.U. enacted the Directive to tackle this
problem. The Directive’s legal standards apply to any entity or person that handles
personal data.22 It requires that personal data be lawfully processed, legitimately
and purposefully collected, relevant, accurate and complete, and that it identify
the “data subject for no longer than necessary.”23 If a data controller does not
comply with these requirements, an individual can request the “erasure or
blocking of [unlawfully processed] data.”24 As with most E.U. laws, the Directive
is meant only as a floor upon which Member States, while incorporating the
Directive into domestic legislation, may flesh out the particularities for their

18

19

20
21
22
23
24

Personality and privacy rights developed out of the recognition that individuals need to develop
their character independent of outside influences. See Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No.
59320/00, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 25, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109029 (last visited Apr.
21, 2016).
See generally GRUNDEGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDEGESETZ] [GG]
[BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, BGBl. I (Ger.) translation at https://www.btg-bestellservice.de
/pdf/80201000.pdf; CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9 (Fr.).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union arts. 1, 7, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 1, 9.
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 1.
Id. at art. 6.
Id.
Id. at art. 12(b).
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national needs and values.25 Therefore, the Directive was intentionally drafted with
flexibility, necessitating clarification by national legislation and the E.U. courts.
This section will describe the CJEU’s 2014 right to be forgotten ruling, which was
a major step toward refining the Directive’s applicability.
The Directive may apply to websites creating and publishing source
information. Therefore, Google argued that since search engines do not actually
produce online content, but instead act as a conduit to distribute that material to
internet users, they cannot qualify as data controllers under the Directive.26 The
CJEU, in what has since been referred to as the right to be forgotten ruling, instead
held that search engines must remove links to qualifying personal information
upon a valid request.27 The CJEU noted that, by providing links to information
relating to an individual in response to searching their name, search engines could
negatively infringe on that individual’s privacy rights.28 The CJEU justified its
holding by relying on the Directive’s purpose and terminology therein, including
definitions for “controller,” “personal data,” and “processing of personal data.”29
The Directive defines a “data controller” as any “natural or legal person,
public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others
determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data.”30 The
Directive defines “personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is one who can
be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity.”31 This includes identification numbers and
“physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural[, and] social identity”
characteristics.32 The Directive defines the “processing of personal data” as
particular actions including the “collection, recording, organization, storage,
adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission,
dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, blocking,
erasure or destruction” of personal data, whether automatic or not.33

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

32
33

Id. at art. 4 (authorizing member states to enact their own national legislation incorporating the
Directive).
Case C-131/12, supra note 2, ¶ 22.
Id. ¶ 41.
Id. ¶¶ 37, 38.
Id. ¶¶ 25, 26, 32.
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 2(d).
Id. art. 2(b). The General Data Protection Regulation’s definition of data controller is virtually the
same as the Directive’s definition of the term. See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 1,
art. 4.
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 2(a).
Id. at art. 2(b).
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Therefore, in order for the Directive to apply to search engines, search
engines must be considered data controllers that process personal data. 34 The
CJEU explicitly characterized a search engine’s activities as “‘collect[ing]’ such
data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’ ‘records’ and ‘organises’ within the
framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’ on its servers and . . . ‘discloses’
and ‘makes available’ to its users in the form of lists of search results.”35
Since these activities mirror the Directive’s definition of “personal data
processor”, the CJEU found that search engines clearly perform that function. 36
And by processing personal data, search engines fall squarely within the “data
controller” classification.37
The CJEU acknowledged that, while the Directive intended for the
definition of “controller” to be broad,38 there are limits to accommodate purely
journalistic data.39 However, this exemption may only apply to publishers of such
data. Therefore, the CJEU held that search engines cannot benefit from this
exemption because, while search engines can link users to journalistic articles,
search engines themselves do not publish that data.40 Further, the Directive is
concerned with data processers that needlessly impinge upon privacy rights;
journalistic data is necessary to inform the public, making it exempt from the
Directive’s restrictions. Therefore, the CJEU argues that search engines are
precisely the type of data processors the Directive intends to regulate: search
engines are widely used, allowing them to encroach on privacy rights far more
easily than website publishers can on their own.41 Search engines play an active
role when linking information to users; they archive websites containing personal
data and disseminate information to an audience that may not otherwise have
direct access to this personal information.42 This easy access to personal data,
which has the potential to harm an individual’s reputation, is precisely what the
Directive and the CJEU target.

34

Id. at art. 2(d).

35

Case C-131/12, supra note 2, ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 26.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 34.
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 9. An example
of this exception would be a news article published on the B.B.C.

36
37
38
39

40

41
42

Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, arts. 17, 37; Case
C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. ¶ 36-38,
¶ 85.
Id. ¶ 36-38.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos, ¶¶ 37–38,
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&docla
ng=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=542615 (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
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III. A PPLICATION OF THE T ERM “S EARCH E NGINE ”
Determining how broad the CJEU intended the scope of “search engine” to
be is a difficult task. The term “search engine” has been used in a variety of legal
contexts within the E.U. Generally, E.U. courts have defined and used the term
broadly and have applied it to internal search engines within websites. For
example, in a European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case involving the
alleged interception of certain communications, the court loosely referred to a
search engine as “[a]n automated sorting system.”43 This definition includes
systems with a wide range of search features and does not exclude those operating
internally within websites. Reviewing E.U. case law, officials’ statements, and
legislation for common definitions of “search engine” will provide guidance on
how to interpret the usage of “search engine” in the right to be forgotten ruling.
Former Advocate General of the CJEU,44 Niilo Jääskinen,45 delivered an
Opinion on the right to be forgotten case. In his Opinion, he further clarified the
court’s explanation of how search engines operate.46 According to Advocate
General Jääskinen, a search engine processes internet content “from existing
websites, [by] cop[ying], analy[zing] and index[ing] that content on its own
devices,”47 but is not involved in the actual creation of web content. When the
search engine receives search terms from a user, it provides that user with
hyperlinks to existing web content based on the search terms.48 This inclusive
definition does not restrict the types of search engines subject to the Directive.
And since many internal search engines operate similarly––linking users to results
from the sites’ own archives––it appears that they also must comply with right to
be forgotten requests.
Advocate General Kokott of the CJEU49 continued along this broad vein. In
a non-binding Opinion, she referred to the ECtHR’s own internal search feature
as a “search engine.”50 This reflects, in the E.U., the common usage of “search
engine” as applying to all forms of search engine, without limitation. Since the
43
44

45
46
47
48
49
50

Liberty v. United Kingdom, supra note 12, ¶ 43, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-87207 (last
visited Apr. 21, 2016).
At the CJEU, there is one judge from each of the E.U. countries, and 11 Advocates General. During
the public hearing stage, the CJEU may decide that the Advocate General must publish an opinion
regarding the case at issue, which is to be delivered after the hearing. See COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
FORMER MEMBERS, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_9606/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen, supra note 10, ¶¶ 32–35.
Id. ¶ 34.
Id. ¶ 33.
Advocate General Kokott is one of the 11 working for the CJEU. See PRESENTATION OF THE
MEMBERS, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7026 (last visited Mar. 30, 2016).
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, supra note 11.
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Directive would apply to even the ECtHR’s internal search engine,51 it is possible
that a right to be forgotten request, albeit legitimate, would force the suppression
of data published by the ECtHR.
In another case involving Google, the CJEU described Google’s search
engine as a tool that guides users to relevant webpages based on their search
queries.52 This characterization also applies to internal search engines within
websites also provide the same function to users of those websites.
Therefore, the E.U. legislative and judicial contexts would suggest that the
CJEU likely intended for the term “search engine” to be broadly read, without
restrictions to its applicability.

IV. T HE D ATA P ROTECTION D IRECTIVE
The Directive arose out of a growing concern that advancements in the
Internet and its global reach necessitated that the right to be forgotten be
modernized to keep up with these developments.53 The Directive is binding and
most Member States have implemented it through domestic legislation.54 A few
Member States––including France, Ireland, Lithuania, Sweden, and Spain––
already had data protection and privacy legislation before the Directive’s
enactment. But the European Commission felt that it would be beneficial to enact
a uniform, current data protection law to reduce the administrative and economic
burdens resulting from disparities between member states.55 This Section will
closely examine the Directive to determine how broad the right to be forgotten
was intended to be, and if there are any conceivable limits to the right.
By implementing the Directive, as well as adhering to the right to be
forgotten ruling, Member States’ data protection and privacy legislation must
contemplate search engines as data controllers. However, the right to be forgotten
ruling is not the only case requiring the CJEU’s guidance on the Directive’s
parameters. Since its enactment, the Directive has faced backlash regarding its

51

The Directive’s exception will not apply to the ECtHR’s internal search engine because the ECtHR
is not a publisher of purely journalistic data.

52

Case C-236/08, Google France Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 22.
FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” RULING (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/
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Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 1; REFORM OF
THE DATA PROTECTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN THE E.U., http://ec.europa.eu/justice/dataprotection/reform/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
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potential transgression on the freedom of speech.56 Some of this criticism has
found its way into the CJEU’s docket. Therefore, it is useful to examine the
CJEU’s approach to dealing with the issue of the Directive’s conflict with the
freedom of speech as it may illuminate how comprehensive the Directive’s scope
is.
A Swedish case involving the publishing of personal information on the
Internet without the subject’s permission dealt with the interaction between free
speech and privacy rights.57 In 1998, Bodil Lindqvist launched a website
containing information about herself and her colleagues.58 Ms. Lindqvist had not
obtained her colleagues’ consent before publishing the information.59 Despite the
need to protect personal data, the importance of balancing this interest with the
freedom of speech was not lost on the court.60 The CJEU acknowledged that
Member States had the authority to enact stricter regulations than those contained
in the Directive when implementing the Directive into their legislation.61 But the
domestic regulations must maintain the Directive’s balance between the
individual’s right to have personal data protected and the right to free speech. 62
Therefore, the Directive itself, as well as member states’ implementation thereof,
cannot be so broad as to flatly obstruct the freedom of speech, even for the sake
of data privacy.63 The CJEU asserted that the Directive’s privacy objective is not
wholly supreme over the freedom of speech.64 However, the CJEU provided no
guidance as to where the balance between the two competing rights lies, leaving
the Member States to solve this conundrum on a case-by-case basis.65
In a Finnish case involving a newspaper’s publication of public tax
information, the CJEU declared the freedom of speech to be a broadly interpreted
fundamental right.66 A local newspaper enlisted the company Markkinaporssi to
provide the surnames and personal tax data of individuals exceeding a certain
income threshold.67 Markkinaporssi collected the information from sources that
56

Chelsea E. Carbone, To Be or Not to Be Forgotten: Balancing the Right to Know with the Right to Privacy in
the Digital Age, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 525, 560 (2015).
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Id. ¶ 85.
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Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, arts. 1(37), 9.
The Directive allows member states to “restrict[ ] the scope of . . . the obligations” of data controllers
in certain circumstances, including where national or public security are primary concerns. See id. ¶ 7;
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, art. 13.
Case C-101/01, Lindqvist, 2003 E.C.R. I-19271, ¶ 90.
Case C-73/07, Tietusuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunan Markkinaporssi Oy, 2008 E.C.R. I-9831, ¶ 56.
Case C-73/07, Tietusuojavaltuutettu, 2008 E.C.R. I-9831, ¶¶ 25, 26.
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the Finnish tax authority made public.68 Some of those individuals requested
Markkinaporssi to cease collecting their information under the Directive; it
refused, and the individuals sued.69 The court examined the Directive’s position
on privacy rights versus the freedom of speech to decide whether processing
personal data with the purpose of publishing the tax data was protected by the
Directive’s free speech exemptions.70 The court found that the Directive does not
impinge upon the individual’s freedom of speech for the sake of privacy rights
since the Directive specifically aims to “reconcile” the two.71 In fact, the court
acknowledged that the freedom of speech is a broad right.72 The Directive upholds
freedom of speech, according to the court, by providing exemptions for purely
journalistic purposes.73 This exemption protects the public’s interest in accessing
information. However, the freedom of speech is protected only to the extent it is
used for purely journalistic purposes.74
Therefore, the Directive makes clear that protecting privacy rights is often
the default and exceptions to it are narrow. Because the CJEU likely understood
the Directive this way, the right to be forgotten ruling probably intended to
continue this broad reading of the Directive.75

V. P ERSONALITY AND P RIVACY R IGHTS IN E UROPE
Having control over one’s image is a fundamental––even constitutional––
principle in many European countries.76 Yet, the freedom of speech is also a
constitutional guarantee.77 Often the two rights conflict where information
identifying an individual is published through an online medium, potentially
damaging the individual’s reputation. In the U.S., the freedom of speech is a
deeply entrenched and protected right;78 in Europe, if an individual’s personality
rights are truly at stake, those rights will take precedence over the freedom of
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Id. ¶ 25.
Id. ¶¶ 31, 32.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 54.
Id. ¶ 56.
Id.
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Aidan Forde, Implications of the Right to be Forgotten, 18 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 83, 105 (2015)
(observing that the CJEU broadly interpreted the Directive’s definition of “controller”).
Information Society, Privacy and Data Protection, EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS, http://fra.europa.eu/en/theme/information-society-privacy-and-data-protection (last
visited Mar. 30, 2016).
Id.
Jeanne M. Hauch, Protecting Private Facts in France: The Warren & Brandeis Tort is Alive and Well and
Flourishing in Paris, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1219, 1227 (1994).
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speech.79 This Section will examine the E.U.’s view of personality rights, as well
as particular member states’ attempts to balance the competing principles.
Looking to the broader European context, Article 8 of the European
Convention for Human Rights (Convention) provides a legal guarantee of privacy
rights, stating that “[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private . . . life.”80
The ECtHR has concluded that privacy rights protection, as guaranteed by Article
8, is meant to allow each person to develop their personality “without outside
interference.”81 The Directive specifically seeks to recognize these fundamental
personality and privacy rights included in the Convention.82
The E.U.’s Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter) also reinforces the
sanctity of privacy and personality rights. Article 1 of the Charter protects human
dignity above all else.83 Article 7 of the Charter protects the individual’s private
life (like Articles 1 and 2 of Germany’s Basic Law, and Article 9 of France’s Civil
Code, discussed below); Article 8 of the Charter protects data subjects by granting
them the right to consent, access, and to rectify personal information.84
Because Member States have valued these privacy rights for decades, the
E.U. was likely inspired to formally recognize these rights. Both France and
Germany have a strong tradition of protecting personality and privacy rights.
Article 9 of the French Civil Code recognizes the right to privacy in everyone. 85
But it also recognizes the freedom of speech in Article 10 of the French Civil
Code. 86 France places an enormous value on privacy rights: privacy rights are
guaranteed and viewed “as essential to the defense of human dignity against the
onslaught of electronic technology.”87 France’s highest court, the Cour de

79
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Scott J. Shackelford, Fragile Merchandise: A Comparative Analysis of the Privacy Rights for Public Figures, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 125, 160–61 (2012).
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950,
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
Von Hannover v. Germany, ¶ 95. This can be understood as protecting individuals’ expectation to
carry on certain aspects of their lives in a manner they choose, without involving anyone else. See
Niemietz v. Germany, App. No. 13710/88, 1992 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 29, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-57887 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
Parliament and Council Directive on Processing of Personal Data, supra note 4, ¶ 1.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 21, art. 1.
Id. at art. 8.
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 9 (Fr.).
Id. at art. 10.
Hauch, supra note 82, at 1223.
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Cassation,88 has held that “French courts must . . . plac[e] limits on free expression
to protect privacy.”89
Germany’s Basic Law recognizes personality rights in Articles 1 and 2. 90
Article 1 declares that “[h]uman dignity shall be inviolable.”91 Article 2 states that
“[e]very person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar
as he does not violate the rights of others or offend against the constitutional
order or the moral law”92 and “[f]reedom of the person shall be inviolable.”93
Privacy rights can be found within personality rights: courts protect privacy rights
to ensure the protection of personality rights.94 The Federal Constitutional Court
of Germany summarized personality rights as the following:
The general right of personality and its special manifestations, like the right
to one’s own picture and the right to one’s name, protect not only nonmaterial but also commercial personality interests. If these components of the
right of personality which are of financial value are culpably infringed by an
unauthorized use of a picture, name or other characteristic feature of the
personality, the holder of the right of personality is entitled to a claim to
compensation for harm, [independent] of the severity of the interference.95

This emphasizes the importance Germany places on personality and privacy
rights. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany has held that human dignity
is inviolable, even in the face of the freedom of speech and art.96 Personality rights
can supersede the freedom of speech in the following circumstances:
[T]rue statements . . . are likely to have a negative effect on the person or his
reputation, which is disproportionate to the interest of disseminating the
truth. This is in particular the case where statements reach a wide audience

88

ABOUT THE COURT, COUR DE CASSATION, https://www.courdecassation.fr/about_the_court
_9256.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).

89

Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters], 2e civ., July 8, 1981, Bull. civ. II, No.
152, ¶ 98 (Fr.). In that case, an Italian magazine had published a story concerning, not only public
facts regarding actress Romy Schneider’s second marriage and pregnancy, but also private
information about her psychological state regarding the events. The court held that, despite Ms.
Schneider’s fame, she was entitled to certain expectations regarding her private life, which had been
violated by the magazine. So while the magazine would ordinarily be allowed to publish material by
relying on freedom of speech, it could not do so where that publication infringed upon an individual’s
private life.
GRUNDEGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, supra note 20, arts. 1, 2.
Id. at art. 1.
Id. at art. 2.
Id.
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Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Dec. 1, 1999, Entscheidungen Des
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 50, 133, translation at https://law.utexas.edu/
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and lead to a stigmatisation of the person concerned in such a way that he is
likely to suffer from social exclusion or isolation.97

However, there are limits to personality rights. The Court has held that
“[p]ersonality interests must as a rule take second place to freedom of opinion if
the disputed statement has as its subject facts which are to be regarded as true.”98
The Court’s statements are not definitive, objective guidance; therefore, this leaves
the determination of which way the balance swings on a case-by-case basis.99
Privacy rights in Europe are broad, “cover[ing] the physical and
psychological integrity of a person[, including] a person’s right to their image[, and
thus] personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not
be published without their consent.”100 The desire to protect personality rights is
strongly entrenched within European society and is reflected in the Directive,
which is meant to protect individual privacy, and by extension personality, rights
against data controllers. This emphasis likely influenced the CJEU to interpret the
Directive as broadly encompassing all data controllers, including internal search
engines.

VI. H OW THE R IGHT TO BE F ORGOTTEN C AN BE
I MPLEMENTED G LOBALLY
The right to be forgotten in the European context is broad, and likely
includes both general and internal search engines. It affects all E.U. member states
now and will likely spill outside Europe’s borders in the future. Many States have
expressed an interest in adopting this right to protect their citizens’ online privacy.
The right to be forgotten can be a useful tool to protect individuals’ online privacy
rights. Currently, no international law that applies outside the E.U. contains an
explicit right to be forgotten, and it would be a difficult feat to enact such a
provision due to the extreme variances in each country’s fundamental values,
legislation, and case law.
However, there may be some options available to the international
community to effectuate this as a growing number of States seek to implement
personal data protections for their citizens. First, existing international treaties can
incorporate the right to be forgotten and, like the Directive, act as baselines upon
which countries can expand with their own local legislation. The best vehicle for
97
98

99
100

Lawrence Siry & Sandra Schmitz, A Right to Be Forgotten? – How Recent Developments in Germany May
Affect the Internet Publishers in the US, 4 EUR. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2012).
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Mar. 24, 1998, Entscheidungen
Des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 97, 391 (Ger.), translation at http://germanlawarchive.
iuscomp.org/?s=lebach&submit=.
Sirv & Schmitz, supra note 101, at 4.
Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 83,
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109034 (last visited Apr. 21, 2016).
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this will likely be the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which
recognizes a person’s right to privacy.101 Second, the international community
could leave it up to the search engines to make available their delisting practices
globally, thereby avoiding the need to overhaul national laws.
The prospect of developing an international right to be forgotten convention
seems daunting due to disparate experiences and values across the globe.
However, scholars have noted a trend: while Germany is a pioneer and champion
of recognizing privacy rights, a growing number of countries have adopted these
rights into their constitutions, legislation, and case law.102 Humanity has been
revitalized in light of past and recent atrocities, such as Apartheid and the
Holocaust.103 When fundamental rights compete, many States protect human
dignity and privacy rights at the expense of unrestrained speech.104
Because the Internet makes it easier to invade individual privacy and tarnish
reputations, many countries, including Hong Kong, South Korea, Canada, Russia,
and South Africa, are actively pushing to adopt right to be forgotten-type
legislation.105 Some have called for search engine giants, such as Google, to make
their right to be forgotten policies and practices universal. This will likely be the
most practical means of globally implementing the right before attempting to
establish a law that considers each State’s unique prioritization of fundamental
rights.
This Section will survey several countries and regions outside the E.U., to
determine whether and how the right to be forgotten could expand globally. It
will also examine possible means of implementing this right internationally, if the
right to be forgotten expands.

A. The Right to be Forgotten Around the World
Although the rhetoric in the media appears to strongly oppose the right to
be forgotten ruling, many governments act in favor of it. The international
response to the right to be forgotten ruling has ranged across a spectrum. On one
side, the E.U.’s Directive is expansive, including virtually every form of search
engine within its scope in order to protect privacy rights. At the other end of the
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
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Marc Rotenberg, Preserving Privacy in the Information Society, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
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eng/papers/paper_10.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
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spectrum is the U.S., which rejects the right to be forgotten and broad privacy
rights in favor of maintaining its expansive freedom of speech rights.106
As this is a developing right, not every country or region has a history of
privacy rights or is taking definitive steps in either direction. But the international
trend appears to be moving more toward the European approach of prioritizing
privacy rights over free speech regarding online activity. The rest of this Section
will attempt to organize various countries along the spectrum.
First, on the E.U.-side of the spectrum, are Russia, Japan, and Hong Kong.
Russia recently signed into law the right to be forgotten. This law specifically
requires “search engines to delete links leading to spurious or dated information
about Russian citizens should they request.”107
Both Hong Kong and Japan have also expressed a desire to create a right to
be forgotten for their citizens.108 In 2014, the Privacy Commissioner of Hong
Kong, Allan Chiang Yam-wang, announced that he intended to lobby for Google
to extend its right to be forgotten policy to Hong Kong and surrounding Asian
countries.109 He admitted that, while freedom of speech is important, the right to
be forgotten is equally important.110 Hong Kong has data privacy laws, but search
engines do not fall under the law’s definition of “data user,”111 which is analogous
to the Directive’s usage.112 This is why Hong Kong’s Privacy Commissioner has
appealed to Google directly for their delisting service rather than attempt to create
new legal means.113 Hong Kong’s privacy protection ordinance certainly provides
some basis for the right to be forgotten. If Google were to deny the Privacy
Commissioner’s request, Hong Kong could easily amend its privacy ordinance to
formally adopt the right to be forgotten as against search engines.114
106

Shoor, supra note 16, at 492–93.
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Putin Signs “Right to be Forgotten” Bill into Law, RT (July 14, 2015, 2:41pm), http://on.rt.com/i4qc9r.
As mentioned previously, Japan has ordered a search engine to delink data associated with a Japanese
individual under its data privacy laws. This certainly lays the groundwork for adopting the right to
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Deletes One-Third of E.U. Requests, WHIR, (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.thewhir.com/web-hostingnews/right-forgotten-spreads-japan-google-deletes-one-third-eu-requests.
Cannix Yau, Hong Kong to Lobby Google Over the ‘Right to be Forgotten,’ SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
(June 16, 2014, 9:31am), http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1533618/privacy-chiefallan-chiang-wants-right-be-forgotten-extended-asia?page=all.
Id.
A data user is defined as “a person who . . . controls the collection, holding, processing or use of the
data.” Since search engines cannot be classified as persons, the data privacy act cannot apply to them.
See Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance § 2, (2013) Cap. 486, 1 (H.K.) [hereinafter Personal Data
Ordinance].
Yau, supra note 109.
Id.
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for the correction of personal data. See Personal Data Ordinance, supra note 115.
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Recently, a Hong Kong court decision brought the territory one step closer
to solidifying the right to be forgotten within its jurisdiction.115 In that decision,
David Webb operated a website in Hong Kong containing certain Hong Kong
business-related information.116 The website provided links to a case that listed the
parties’ full names, even though a judicial order redacted their names 10 years after
the case closed.117 Users could access the names by searching the “Who’s Who”
search of Mr. Webb’s website.118 Under Hong Kong’s data privacy act, the Privacy
Commissioner ordered Mr. Webb to remove the links from his website.119 The
Administrative Appeals Board upheld the Privacy Commissioner’s enforcement
order on July 13, 2015.120 Therefore, in certain circumstances Hong Kong is
willing to protect privacy rights over the freedom of speech.
Moving toward the middle of the spectrum are countries that have privacy
laws or case law that applied right to be forgotten-type principles against search
engines, but have not completely embraced the right. These include Singapore,
various South American countries, Australia, and Canada.
Both South Korea and Singapore protect data privacy.121 For example,
Singapore adopted the Personal Data Protection Act, which it strictly enforces.122
The Act allows individuals to have their online information corrected and for
personal data to be destroyed.123 Therefore, it is conceivable that Singapore may
soon apply the Act against search engines and adopt its own right to be forgotten.
South American countries have bowed to pressure from the E.U. to enact
data privacy laws that comply with the Directive.124 However, South American
countries have not been vigilantly enforcing their data privacy laws, unlike
Singapore and the E.U.125 South America may be more inclined to recognize the
right to be forgotten within its own countries if the rest of the world follows the
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E.U.; however the region does not appear to prioritize privacy rights enough to
independently take the charge.126
Australia lacks a right to be forgotten law, but it has begun to conceive of
search engines’ active role in spreading potentially defamatory information. The
Australian Law Reform Commission has proposed a “right to be deleted,” which
would be analogous to the E.U.’s right to be forgotten.127 Support for this
proposed law is varied.128 Some believe that Australia’s current data privacy and
defamation laws are sufficient to address internet privacy concerns.129 But
Australia’s current data privacy law merely allows individuals to receive
compensation from an entity that breaches their privacy or have their information
corrected.130 And while Australia’s judiciary applies the local defamation laws
against search engines,131 there is currently no mechanism by which individuals
can disassociate themselves from online information.132 The proposed right to be
deleted would address this concern.
Despite being a close physical and cultural neighbor of the U.S., Canada
aligns more closely with the E.U. regarding privacy rights. While neither the
Canadian Constitution nor the Charter of Rights and Freedoms has an explicit
privacy right,133 the right has cemented its place in case law. Following quickly on
the heels of the right to be forgotten ruling, the Supreme Court of Canada held in
R. v. Spencer that individuals have a “reasonable expectation of anonymity.”134 This
language reflects the theme behind the right to be forgotten. In that case, the
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with questions regarding individual privacy rights
where a man kept a file of child pornography on his computer.135 The man’s
internet provider handed over his IP address and subscriber information, against
126
127

128
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130
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(2014).
Privacy Act 1988 § 25, 20S, (Austl.), available at https://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/
C2015C00598/Html/.
See Duffy v. Google Inc (2015) SASC 170 (Sup. Ct. S. Austl.).
Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era: Issues Paper 43, AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION ¶¶
169–171 (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/invasions-privacy-ip43 (inferring that
new protections could give individuals more control over their private information).
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Canada to CAPA Conference 1997, https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/spd/archive/02_05_a_971030
_e.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
R. v. Spencer, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 212, 215 (Can.).
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his wishes, to the police upon their request when investigating him.136 The court
acknowledged that individuals’ privacy rights must extend to their online data,
stating that “[t]he identity of a person linked to their use of the Internet must be
recognized as giving rise to a privacy interest beyond that inherent in the person’s
name, address and telephone number found in the subscriber information.”137
However, Canada also exhibits skepticism about creating a right to be
forgotten law––especially against search engines––which differs from the E.U.’s
attitude. There is some doubt as to whether the CJEU’s right to be forgotten ruling
can be applied just yet in Canada. In 2011, the Supreme Court of Canada
distinguished between producing defamatory content and providing a hyperlink
to already published data.138 It held that the latter did not itself cause harm.139 Thus,
Canadian privacy laws do not automatically require search engines to remove
personal data under the current privacy laws; publishers of personal data are, on
the other hand, required to do so.140
Notably, Canada’s privacy act, the Personal Information Protection and
Electronic Documents Act, provides the basis for adopting a future right to be
forgotten. Like the Directive, Canada’s privacy act requires personal data to be
“accurate, complete, and up-to-date as is necessary for the purposes for which it
is to be used.”141 And it applies its provisions broadly to “organizations,”142 which
could include search engines in the future. The Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada, which is typically the first stop for a data privacy
complaint, has hinted that this could be the direction Canada is headed. In one
instance, the Privacy Commissioner made a search engine remove the URL link
to the complainant’s resume after she had posted it on a job search website. 143
This happened after the 2011 case mentioned above, which illustrates how
Canada’s view of search engines is changing.
In another case dealing with a search engines, the Privacy Commissioner
recommended that a website “remove [the] decisions from search engine
136
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Id.
Id.
Personal Information Protection and Electronic Document Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, First Schedule (Can.)
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Engine, OFFICE OF THE PRIVACY COMMISIONER OF CANADA, https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/ser/
2014/er_005_140123_e.asp (last visited Apr. 23, 2016).
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caches.”144 The website collected and stored Canadian court and tribunal cases
through its search engine, thus allowing users to find the information by searching
for individuals’ names.145 The website itself did not add or publish additional
personal information aside from providing links to the court cases.146 To date, the
website has refused to comply with the Privacy Commissioner’s recommendation,
but the Privacy Commissioner maintains its continued interest in this matter and
may pursue it through the courts.147 Canada appears to be cognizant of personal
data privacy threats, but is taking a conservative approach to applying a right to
be forgotten-type rule.
Finally, New Zealand is perhaps the closest to the U.S.-end of the spectrum
in that it has not recognized a right to be forgotten. However, it is not ruling the
possibility out.148 Instead, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner in New Zealand
is adopting a wait-and-see approach.149 New Zealand, like most countries, has its
own privacy act and tort, which the Privacy Commissioner believes adequately
addresses Internet privacy concerns for the time being.150 Yet New Zealand’s
Privacy Act only allows for individuals to demand that their online personal data
be corrected if it is “[in]accurate, [outdated], [in]complete, [ir]relevant, or . . .
misleading.151 The right to be forgotten is more than just ensuring personal data is
accurate; it provides a means for individuals to disassociate themselves from their
past. Overall, New Zealand is skeptical of the right to be forgotten’s efficacy and
likely will not adopt it anytime soon.
A number of countries are seriously considering the right to be forgotten, or
at least online privacy rights. Perhaps the challenge will be implementing this right
under the varying international legal regimes. However, there is real concern over
the serious impact caused by having search engines of all forms forever linking a
person’s name to past negative associations. Yet the U.S. remains one of the
clearest regime contrasts to countries that have adopted the right to be forgotten
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due to its opposing prioritization of freedom of speech. Despite this, at least one
poll suggests that Americans actually want the U.S. to recognize a right to be
forgotten.152 This may be impossible to achieve, however, under the current
understanding of the First Amendment.153 Although human dignity, and by
extension privacy rights and the right to be forgotten, is an important value in the
U.S., it does not supersede the Constitutional freedom of speech.154
The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law in the United States.155 Human
dignity and privacy rights may be implied in the Constitution under the 9th, 13th,
and 14th Amendments’ recognition of equality.156 However, the 14th
Amendment, for example, applies strictly against the State but does not restrict
the actions of private citizens or entities, including search engines like Google. 157
No constitutional basis exists to apply human dignity rights against private search
engines.158
And ultimately freedom of speech still has the upper hand over implied
human dignity rights, as the latter apply only in narrow circumstances.159 U.S. case
law reinforces the idea that the right to be forgotten and privacy rights fall in the
shadows of the right to free speech.160
Over time the U.S. could become more amenable to protecting broader
privacy rights. On September 23, 2013, California enacted a right to be forgottentype law specifically for minors, whereby minors may demand that an internet
website operator remove certain personal data.161 This does not apply to search
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engines at the moment, although it appears that the door toward a nationwide
right to be forgotten law has been opened a crack. Ultimately, however, the U.S.
appears steadfast in promoting the First Amendment’s freedom of speech over
privacy rights, which are merely implied and limited in scope.162
Even if the U.S. never adopts a right to be forgotten, American data
controllers, including search engines, operating in jurisdictions that recognize the
right to be forgotten, will have to operate within the right’s parameters. This may
place Americans at a disadvantage: people around the world will be able to protect
their reputations and control their personal data, but Americans will not enjoy this
right. Considering the international trend, the U.S. can choose either to remain an
outlier or acknowledge the value in protecting privacy rights and the right to be
forgotten over the freedom of speech in certain circumstances. The right to be
forgotten does not mean the end of free speech—freedom of speech is not
absolute even within the U.S.—and it will likely endure refining due to the
overbroad application to search engines.
Regardless of how the U.S. acts, it is apparent that the E.U. will not be alone
in implementing the right to be forgotten. And with growing international
support, the right will evolve to accommodate new notions of privacy.

B. Search Engines Should Impose the Right to be Forgotten
Internationally
To truly comply with the right to be forgotten and ensure the protection of
personal privacy rights, it may be constructive for Google and other search
engines to expand delisting practices into a global policy. The fact that there are
many countries around the world that support, and actively lobby for, this benefit
may make this a popular choice. Currently, the right to be forgotten is ambiguous,
with little case law providing guidance as to its compliance. Imposing an
international right to be forgotten law against all forms of search engines is not
practical. Countries are still in the process of determining how the right to be
forgotten fits in with their current data privacy laws, and whether search engines
should even be subject to those laws. If left up to each country to incorporate the
right to be forgotten into their legislation, global adoption of this right will not
likely occur any time soon, if at all, due to the lengthy process involved in drafting
and implementing new laws. Therefore, as the Privacy Commissioner of Hong
Kong has suggested, search engines themselves could apply their delisting
practices across the world.
Google has already had to develop its own metric to sort through which
right to be forgotten requests are valid. It may be beneficial to take New Zealand’s
162
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wait-and-see approach to observe how well that metric adheres to the right to be
forgotten’s objectives. Google has already independently extended its right to be
forgotten services to Switzerland, Iceland, Norway, and Lichtenstein. 163
Additionally, Google now “remove[s] pages from [its] search results when
required by local law.”164 For example, Google obliged when the Tokyo District
Court “ordered Google to delete about half of the search results for a man linked
to a crime he didn’t commit” under Japan’s privacy laws.165
Following the CJEU’s ruling, Google assembled an Advisory Committee to
Google on the right to be forgotten to determine how Google should proceed
under the ruling, and where.166 The Committee published its findings in January
2015.167 Geographically, the Committee recommended that Google apply its
delisting practices to “nationally directed versions of Google’s search services [for
example, google.de for Germany] within the E.U.168 However, it did not rule out
the possibility of expanding this practice to countries outside the E.U.
It is important to note that, even where Google delists a particular website
per a right to be forgotten request from the appropriate national version of
Google, the data can still be accessed through other national versions of Google,
or simply Google.com. Therefore, the efficacy of Google’s delisting practices is
called into question since the delisted personal data is not truly “forgotten.” It is
possible for Google to prevent this circumvention by blocking E.U. Internet
users’ access to delisted personal data across all European national Google
searches.169 However, Google may not necessarily be able to prevent users outside
the E.U. from accessing that data within the E.U. through their own national
Google searches.170 Therefore, so long as this restriction would only apply to E.U.
territory, and leaves the rest of the world’s Internet users free to access the data,
the right to be forgotten’s purpose is not truly met. Further, the Committee raised
concerns of a “repressive regime[ ]” if Google were to control only E.U. citizens’
access to online data.171
However, Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel for Google, opined that
Google would delist personal data only from the particular national Google search
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where the request was made.172 He cited the perceived threat to freedom of
speech, and variations in local laws as to what speech is not legal, as justification. 173
This suggests that local governments must clearly define the right to be forgotten’s
limits within their jurisdictions, and move toward a more international consensus
on the need for this right’s protection and possible restrictions on free speech.
Once that happens Google, and other large search engines, can lead the charge in
extending their delisting practices to citizens across the globe.

VII. C ONCLUSION
Ever since the CJEU published its right to be forgotten ruling, much debate
has surrounded its scope. Both the Directive and the right to be forgotten ruling
fail to define what a search engine is. This is an important oversight. If the
Directive is over-inclusive, it will allow censorship of virtually the entire Internet.
However, if it is under-inclusive, it may not protect individuals’ privacy rights.
While general search engines like Google and Yahoo are better able to shoulder
the financial costs of complying with the right to be forgotten, the ruling suggests
it also applies to internal search engines. Therefore, as it stands, the right to be
forgotten encompasses not only source websites, but every form of search engine
and feature, thereby providing citizens with multiple avenues to suppress their
online personal data.
This is quite an extreme implication of the right to be forgotten. Since the
concerns over privacy rights, which provide the basis for the right to be forgotten,
are shared around the world, the question is whether the right will become a global
phenomenon. Based on how many countries currently view privacy rights in
relation to freedom of speech, it appears that they are open to adopting some sort
of right to be forgotten. Perhaps the right to be forgotten ruling can be seen as
defining the outer bounds of the right, leaving it up to individual countries to
narrow the scope over time.
And while it appears as though the right to be forgotten will eventually have
a stronger international presence, it will take time for it and privacy rights to
develop at the local level. Through trial and error, limits and balances will be
established to maintain the public’s need to know while also protecting
individuals’ privacy rights. Once this happens, the international community may
172
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choose to make the right to be forgotten an official part of the privacy rights
guaranteed by the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. Until then,
search engines instead will have to take the lead on implementing a global delisting
practice, thereby eliminating difficult negotiations between countries and creating
the groundwork for the right’s international acceptance.
Problems with data privacy are increasing rapidly as people upload more and
more of their lives onto the internet. More countries will therefore be motivated
to protect their citizens’ data privacy. Countries interested in recognizing a right
to be forgotten will likely want search engines to honor their citizens’ right to be
forgotten requests, as they do with E.U. citizens’ requests. Eventually, more of
these countries will demand that search engines geographically expand their
delisting practices; in turn, search engines will grow more willing to do so.
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